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SPHEX CLUB PAPERS

of

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A century and a half ago when thirteen British colonies in North America were struggling for their political independence, eight hundred negro volunteers from what is now the Republic of Haiti were among the troops sent by France to aid the colonists. The black soldiers joined the Franco-American army at Savannah and it is related that during the seige of that city "these colored militiamen saved the Franco-American army from total disaster by heroically covering its retreat, which was very near being cut off by Lt. Col. Maitland." Today the descendants of those colored militiamen have had their own hard won political independence taken from them by the descendants of the men whose independence their forefather helped win.

Indirectly the negro soldiers of Haiti have been of even greater service to the United States than were those eight hundred who fought at Savannah. When Napoleon's effort to reconquer Haiti had failed and thousands of his best soldiers had found a final resting place in Haitian soil, that great military genius exclaimed: "If a few negroes in far off Saint Dominique can destroy my legions, I cannot hold Louisiana in case of war." This conviction caused him to abandon his dream of making Louisiana the brightest star in his royal diadem and made France receptive to the idea of selling Louisiana to the United States. It is, of course, an exaggeration, but one writer goes so far as to assert that Toussaint L'Ouverture, the Haitian negroes' leader, "had as much to do with the Louisiana Purchase as Robert Livingston or Thomas Jefferson the President."

Before passing on to a brief summary of Haitian history, which is necessary to an understanding of Haitian attitude toward foreign

intervention of any sort, and to the events leading up to and during the American Occupation, it may be interesting to note that among the eight hundred negroes from Haiti who fought at Savannah was one named Christophe, a pure-blooded black and an ex-slave who subsequently ruled over part of his native land as a king under the title of Henri I.

The island of which Haiti is the western part and the Dominican Republic the eastern part was discovered by Columbus on his first voyage, and was by him named Little Spain. In the two centuries following the discovery, Little Spain, like other parts of the new world, was the prey of Spanish adventurers seeking gold. Peopled when discovered by Carib Indians estimated to number about one million, the treachery and cruelty which have become synonymous in this country with the Spanish adventurer quickly reduced them to a mere handful, and it is unlikely that today a single trace of the blood of the aborigines exists in the island. This treatment of a colored race by a white race is a part of the history and tradition of Haiti and has its part in influencing the blacks to avoid contact with whites as much as possible.

The Spaniards were not the only adventurers who came to the new world. Among the others were French buccannereers who seized the small island on Tortuga, off the coast of Little Spain, and harried the western end of the Spanish possession, which in 1697, by the treaty of Wiswick, was ceded to France by Spain. The French imported negroes for labor, and for many years the sugar and coffee plantations worked

by these slaves proved better gold mines to the French than the actual gold mines had to the Spanish. In Haiti, by both whites and blacks, and later in the Dominican Republic by natives of that small nation, I was told that the French in Haiti had been far more cruel masters than had the Spanish. It was said to have been their policy to keep the slave population up by importation rather than by breeding, it being considered cheaper to work the slaves to death and import new ones than to adopt that degree of kindness which makes natural increase possible. Of all their animal possessions the negro slaves were the most carelessly and cruelly treated. How the slaves were regarded is illustrated by the case of a French planter who, to amuse guests, had slaves buried up to their necks, the protruding heads being used as ten pins for the guest to roll heavy balls at.

In the earlier days of French occupation of Saint Dominiques, as Haiti was then called, there were very few white women. The Frenchmen took negro women to live with them, occasionally as legal wives, but more often as concubines, and it became the custom and unwritten law for the mulatto offspring of those matings to be given freedom by their fathers. In this way quite a large group of free mulattoes came into existence, and by 1789 they almost equalled the white population. In that year there were 40,000 whites, 28,000 mulattoes and 432,000 negro slaves. There was no friction at first between these freed mulattoes and the whites. The distinction was as between freeman and slave, not between white and colored. Two things, however, operated to change this state of affairs. In the first place as Haiti became a more comfortable

place in which to live white women came from France. These of course looked down upon the colored people, a natural racial feeling which was intensified because many of the mulattoes had been industrious and accumulated property, including slaves of their own. Their children had been in many cases sent to France to be educated. And the mulattoes, freed of poverty and ignorance as well as of servitude, deeply resented any white claim of social superiority. The result was not merely an intense bitterness between white freemen and colored freemen, but the latter began to feel a bond of union with the black slaves whom until then they had looked down because of their slavery and had felt little or no kinship with on account of blood. Possibly the mulattoes were partially responsible for a revolt of the negro slaves which occurred in 1790; certainly many of them sympathized with the blacks.

The revolt of the blacks was unsuccessful. It was put down by the whites with greatest severity, and the two leaders of it, after a mock trial, were sentenced as follows: "whilst alive to have their arms, legs, thighs and spines broken; and afterward to be placed on a wheel, their faces toward heaven, there to stay as long as it would please God to preserve their lives; and when dead, their heads to be cut off and exposed on poles." This inhuman sentence was carried out to the letter.

When the revolution in France occurred the idea of liberty, equality and fraternity quickly spread to Haiti. The white Frenchmen welcomed it for themselves but determined to deny it to the colored

freemen. This naturally increased the already bitter racial feeling, and the mulattoe stirred up the black slaves, a task not difficult of accomplishment because of their unhappy lot. Turmoil and bloodshed followed, and finally Commissioners were sent from France in an endeavor to settle matters. Fortunately for the blacks Spain and Great Britain chose this time to attack Haiti, the Spanish from their end of the island, the British from the sea. The latter captured Port au Prince. The French Commissioner turned his attention from settling domestic turmoil to saving the colony for France, and to obtain their loyalty and services he freed the entire black population. This was in 1793 and the Commissioner's action put all the black and mulatto population of Haiti back of the newborn French republic. The white Frenchmen in the island, however, put race above nationality and aided the invaders. However, led by Francois Dominique Toussaint, a black ex-slave, the negro army drove both Spanish and British invaders out. Thereafter Toussaint ruled Haiti as virtual dictator.

The French republic having been overthrown by Napoleon, that genius for war made up his mind to give the black upstart in Haiti a lesson. An army of 30,000 men under General Leclerc was sent to bring Haiti back to subjection. The negro leader, by treachery, was captured and sent to France, where he was held in prison without trial and finally died. His lieutenants, however, carried on, and inflamed the blacks by spreading the report that Napoleon intended re-enslaving them. This may not have been true, but it was a splendid piece of propaganda. A long and bloody struggle took place. General Leclerc

was replaced by General Rochambeau, who, angered at the bravery and surprising ability of the black soldiers, resorted to cruelties intended to intimidate them. But the negroes were more afraid of a return of slavery than of Rochambeau's bloodhounds and tortures. Aided by disease which attacked the French army the blacks fought on. Finally the French were driven out, having lost 50,000 men.

Illustrating French cruelty in this war there is this authenticated incident. Defeated by the Haitians at l'Acul, Rochambeau had nevertheless managed to capture 1,500 blacks. These he ordered massacred. Whether from intent or otherwise, the French soldiers went about their work so carelessly that hundreds of the unfortunate negroes did not immediately die. Horribly mutilated, they lived on for hours, making the night hideous with their agonized cries. Up to this time the negro leaders had prevented their troops retaliating for French cruelties, but this was the last straw. At daybreak, in sight of the French army, a number of gibbets were erected. The French officers who had been taken prisoners were hanged from them, following which the negro army attacked the French, driving them from the field in disorder.

The French defeated, Haiti declared her independence on January 1, 1804, and General Dessalines was made president for life with the right to name his successor. Dessalines had been an able army leader. There discipline had been necessary, and he tried to carry into civil life the methods of the military disciplinarian. He became a tyrant, assumed the title of Emperor, and made himself

so well hated that he was finally assassinated. With his fall rival negro leaders clamored to succeed him. In the northeast that same Christophe mentioned as having been at Savannah became king; in the southwest a mulatto named Petion ruled as president. Both were exceptionally able negroes. Christophe had built for himself a great palace which he called Sans Souci. High up on a mountain, it is today the greatest monument to architectural and engineering ability in a pure-blooded African. Christophe recognized laziness as a failing of his race. He made long hours of work compulsory, and his kingdom became prosperous. However, his insistence upon work made him many enemies, who became bold when his health failed. Realizing that he would be overthrown he committed suicide in 1820. Petion had died two years earlier, and with both gone Haiti was reunited under a negro named Boyer as president.

France had never acknowledged the independence of Haiti, and, after the overthrow of Napoleon, King Charles entertained hopes of recovering the colony. Negotiations were initiated, but the Haitians would listen to nothing save independence. Finally France offered to recognize the independence of Haiti on condition of payment of a large indemnity. Boyer, probably fearing another war with France if he refused, agreed. His action was very unpopular among his people and a subsequent treaty reduced the amount of the indemnity, but meanwhile Haiti had been forced to negotiate a loan from French bankers upon terms very advantageous to them.

In 1821 the Spanish end of the island revolted and secured its independence. The next year, for self protection it became a part

of Haiti, but 21 years later re-established its separate and independent existence as the Dominican Republic.

The history of Haiti from the time it established independence until the American Occupation is a story of turmoil. When our marines landed in 1915 Haiti had had 26 rulers, of whom 14 had served less than a year, and only one had finished his statutory term of seven years alive. The Haitian president is not elected by the people. The people elect a Congress, consisting of upper and lower branches, and these sitting together elect the President.

Not only before the establishment of her independence but since as well Haiti's experiences have been such as to make Haitians wish to have as little to do with white men and white nations as is possible consistent with existence as a nation. One such experience will serve to illustrate. A livery stable at Port au Prince was run by a man named Luders, son of a German father and a Haitian mother and born in Haiti. One of this man's employees became involved in some trouble and resisted arrest. While he was so resisting Luders came up and took his employee's side against the police. Both were arrested and sentenced to jail on a minor charge. Upon appealing this light sentence, a more serious charge was made against them and they were sent to the penitentiary for a year. The German legation then interfered in Luder's behalf, demanding not only his release but the dismissal of the policemen who had arrested him and of the judges who had convicted him. Haiti declined, but upon advice of the American consul a presidential pardon was given Luders. In a few weeks

two German warships entered the harbor, and, threatening to bombard the city if refused, demanded \$20,000 for Luders, apology to the German government and other humiliations. Four hours time was given to comply with this ultimatum.

Incidents such as this, coupled with the history of white oppression and cruelty in Haiti, have given a certain definite aim to Haitian foreign policy. The little negro republic has had what, for want of a better name, might be called the Haitian Monroe doctrine. This has consisted of resisting with all its power any gaining of a foothold in Haiti proper or in the other part of the island by any foreign power. And in domestic law the fear of the white races has found expression in a constitutional provision prohibiting ownership of land by foreigners. However, business organizations incorporated under Haitian law were regarded as Haitians and in that way it was made possible to do business with foreigners, while at the same time guarding against the acquisition of large tracts of land by them. Another thing too has resulted from Haitian fear of white nations. In all their domestic disturbances, the Haitians have carefully avoided doing any damage to the lives or property of foreigners because they have realized that the slightest misstep might result in the dreaded foreign intervention.

Before taking up the American Occupation certain other American contacts with Haiti seem to me important as showing our attitude toward that negro republic.

In 1855 Haiti and the Dominican Republic became involved in war.

Great Britain and France intervened in behalf of the latter and were supported by the United States. In a letter to his agent at the Haitian capital, Secretary of State Webster pointed out that a Haiti at war was not only less able to discharge its financial obligations to France, but that a Haiti at peace was a more fruitful field for the United States and Great Britain to sell those manufactured products of which they had a surplus. Clearly our State Department was actuated not by any belief that the Dominican Republic was in the right, or by any altruistic desire to prevent bloodshed and suffering, but solely by the desire for foreign markets for American manufacturers.

In 1864 a treaty of amity, commerce, navigation and for extradition of criminals was signed between the United States and Haiti, and at that time Haiti endeavored to get the United States and the leading European powers to agree upon the neutralization of the whole island of which Haiti is a part. The European Powers were willing, thus indicating that none of them had any designs upon the island, but the United States refused, and subsequent events lead one to suspect that even then our State Department had its plans and did not wish the United States to become party to a neutralization treaty which would block those plans. During Grant's administration a treaty was negotiated for the annexation of the Dominican Republic by the United States, a thing which would have been impossible had we been party to the neutralization treaty desired by Haiti.

No sooner had the Dominicans learned that their president, Baoz, desired to sell their independence than rebellion broke out. That

this rebellion was encouraged, possibly assisted, by Haiti goes without saying. Haiti felt that if the United States obtained the eastern end of the island it would not be long before she would want the western end also. In January, 1870, our State Department instructed the American minister at Port au Prince to warn Haiti not to interfere in Dominican affairs. In a letter from Hamilton Fish to Minister Bassett it is pointed out that Haiti at one time controlled the whole island and had consistently opposed the occupation of any part of it by a foreign power. Whether this was intended to make the Haitians think the United States sought annexation of the Dominican Republic to prevent it falling again into the hands of Spain or was a mere recital of facts to justify our suspicion that Haiti was encouraging and aiding the Dominican rebels is not clear. Fortunately for the black republic, opposition in the United States Senate frustrated the State Department's effort to secure the proposed annexation.

In 1888, when two negroes were contesting for the presidency of Haiti, street fighting broke out between their adherents in Port au Prince. One of the candidates went out to quell the disturbance. He was killed. The other was then elected, but friends of the dead man organized a rebellion, lead by a negro named Hyppolite. The European Powers recognized the constitutionally elected president, but the United States withheld recognition. Aid for the rebels was sent by Americans and a Haitian gunboat captured an American steamship carrying arms and ammunition to the rebel troops. A prize court confiscated the vessel, but the United States stepped in and forced Haiti

to return the vessel to its owners. The effect of our opposition was to so weaken the regularly elected president that, foreseeing defeat, he left Haiti in August 1889, and the successful rebel leader was named in his stead.

That in refusing recognition to the constitutionally elected president the United States had a motive seems clear. Very likely there was an understanding with the rebel leader, for hardly had he come into power than an effort was made to secure a part of Haiti as payment for our services to him. Rear Admiral Gherardi with a large fleet, carrying 200 guns and crews numbering 2,000 men, appeared at Port au Prince to ask a treaty giving the Mole St. Nicholas to the United States as a naval base. Clearly this great display of force was intended to awe the blacks. Whether the Haitian secretary of state for foreign affairs was a shrewd diplomat or was tipped off by the American minister to Haiti, who was angered because the Admiral ignored him, is not clear. At any rate the negro statesman asked the American admiral for his credentials. But the admiral had forgotten to bring them. He had to send home for them. The delay thus occasioned gave the Haitians time to make clear to their president that if he bartered away the Mole St. Nicholas in return for assistance rendered him he would not live long to enjoy the fruits of office. When the admiral presented his credentials he was informed that the desired treaty could not be had because the constitution of Haiti forbade the alienation of any part of Haitian territory. Thus ended the State Department's second attempt to obtain a foothold in that island. It also ended

the career of Mr. Frederick Douglas a Minister to Haiti, the department holding him responsible for the failure of its plans.

The events here outlined seem to me to indicate that our State Department has for a long time desired some sort of American control in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and that American Occupation in 1915 was not a flower which grew overnight.

Two reasons are frequently given by naval and state department officials for our intervention in and present occupation of Haiti, which began in 1915. The first is that Germany was preparing to seize Haiti for a submarine base; the second that France was about to take over the Haitian customs and that it was necessary for the United States to do it first in order to preserve the Monroe doctrine.

A marine officer in Port au Prince related to me-how authentic the tale is I do not know-that just before the outbreak of the World War in 1914 a German warship entered the harbor of Port au Prince and landed marines with the intent of seizing the customs. Suddenly, however, the German marines were ordered back aboard ship and the vessel hastily left the harbor, presumably because of the unexpected receipt of a wireless message ordering the vessel to join other German warships off the west coast of South America, where they played such havoc with British vessels a little later. If this tale be true, and it is at best largely surmise, it is not adequate basis for declaring that we occupied Haiti to prevent Germany establishing a naval base there. It was a year later before we occupied Haiti and by that time the German war vessels had been sunk, interned in foreign ports, or

bottled up at Kiel. The impossibility of submarines making the long trip from Germany to Haiti and establishing a base there without aid of other war vessels is apparent.

It is almost as hard to believe the tale about France having designs on Haiti. The basis for it lies in the fact that French nationals had business interests in Haiti, that there was some friction with the Haitian government and that a few French marines were landed at Cape Haitien in 1915 during revolutionary disorders in that city. The French, however, withdrew immediately upon the arrival of an American warship. It is to be borne in mind that at the time France was fighting for her very existence, and she needed all available man power at home. That she would pick such a time to waste any military strength in Haiti with the certainty of angering the most powerful neutral, the United States, is past belief.

On the whole these two reasons for American intervention in Haiti seem akin to that more recent tale of the bolshevik menace stalking through Nicaragua. Our state department's yarns, like Munchausens, do credit to its imagination but fail to carry conviction.

The real reason for our taking a hand in the affairs of Haiti can best be learned by examining the happening which preceeded and accompanied the occupation. In 1910 the Haitien government made three errors. It granted a franchise to foreigners to build a railroad, it granted another franchise to foreigners to run a national bank, and it floated a bond issue in France.

The railroad concession was granted to one McDonald, an American. He was to build a railroad from Cape Haitien to Port au Prince, and the government agreed to pay interest at the rate of six percent upon bonds sold to defray the cost of construction, it being provided that the cost should not exceed \$33,000 for any mile.

The banking concession was granted to a syndicate composed of the Banque de l'Union Francais, the National City Bank of New York, and three German-American banking concerns. Secretary of State Knox had a hand in this pie, securing a share for the American firms and inducing them to take it. The bank operated by this syndicate was known as the National Bank of Haiti, was made the sole banking agency of the government and was given a monopoly of note issue for fifty years.

The loan floated in France through the Banque de l'union Francais was for 65,000,000 francs. Nominally at an interest rate of five per cent, the bonds were sold at such discount as to make the interest actually seven per cent. Ten million francs were retained by the bank, without interest, to redeem paper currency of Haiti previously issued, and some seven or eight other million francs for no apparent reason whatever. Haiti actually received of the 65,000,000 francs about 30,000,000.

These concessions were very vigorously opposed in Haiti. The one for the railroad was secured, it is generally admitted, by bribery and corruption. The Haitian president, Antoine Simon, although thought to have had his palm greased, became alarmed at the opposition

and was hesitant about signing the concession. It is related that McDonald then went to Simon's daughter, Celeste, and asked her where were her jewels. When she replied that she had none, he told her that the daughters of all European executives had jewels, and, taking a string of pearls from his pocket, promised they should be hers when her father signed the concession. Simon signed, thereby making himself so unpopular that he was forced from office the next year. And the pearls turned out to be imitations.

Confusion followed in Haiti, and in the four years after these concessions were granted the country had six presidents. Three were assassinated, the others driven out by revolution. This state of affairs offered an opportunity for the United States to obtain control of Haitien customs and in 1914 our state department made repeated overtures to Haiti with that end in view. Twice a special mission was sent, but the Haitiens steadfastly refused to make any such treaty.

By this time the Haitien government and the railroad had become involved in a disagreement. McDonald, who was more or less of an adventurer, had been forced out, and the National City Bank had secured sufficient control to elect one of its employees, Mr. Farnham, president of the railroad. Instead of a continuous line from Port au Prince to Cape Haitien, three separate sections of railway, totalling 110 miles, had been constructed. Each of these was in a part of the country where the topography made construction costs lowest, but the company had charged up \$33,000, the maximum, for

every mile. For two years Haiti had paid interest on the bonds, but in 1914 refused further payment, claiming the contract called for a completed line between the two cities. This the railroad denied, and it further claimed that revolutions had prevented it constructing a completed line.

In the summer of 1914 the National Bank of Haiti, which, it is to be remembered was partially owned by the National City Bank, announced a new policy. Prior to that time receipts of the government had been deposited in the bank and current expenses of the government met with checks on the bank. The bank claimed the right, however, to decide its policy each year and asserted that though the government was obligated to deposit its receipts, principally customs, with the bank received, the bank was not obligated to repay this money to the government until the end of the fiscal year. The bank announced such a policy for the next fiscal year. This obviously would leave the government without funds to meet current expenses.

It is easy to guess the purpose of the bank. That it desired to help the railroad in its dispute with the government is plain on the face of things. It also desired to secure American intervention and seizure of the customs. Our representative in Port au Prince during this dispute between Haiti and the bank cabled the state department that it was the bank's belief that Haiti, when confronted with so desperate a situation, would appeal to Washington and would be willing to agree to American control of the customs in order to get the state department to settle the difficulties between it on the one side and

the bank and the railroad on the other.

The Haitiens, however, took a different view. When the state department indicated that it was interested in the railroad and bank situation, Haiti pointed out that the contracts with those two enterprises specifically provided that neither was to make any disagreement as to the interpretation of the contract a matter for diplomatic action. Thus for either the bank or the railroad to appeal to Washington was a breach of contract. Haiti offered to submit the differences to arbitration as provided in the contracts, but both the bank and the railroad refused.

In 1913 redemption of previously issued Haitien bank notes from a fund deposited with the bank had been temporarily discontinued, and a considerable balance remained with the bank. Haiti wished to obtain this balance. The bank declined to give it up, and, professing to fear that the Haitiens would forcibly seize it, appealed to the state department. A cruiser was sent, marines landed, and \$500,000 of this money belonging to Haiti was removed to New York where it was deposited with the National City Bank. When it was returned in 1919 the National City Bank paid Haiti  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent interest. This was lower than the prevailing rate in New York, and, when it is considered that the half million in gold could be used to establish a much larger credit, it is obvious that the National City Bank made a pretty nice little thing of this transaction. However, it is only fair to say that had the money remained in Haiti no interest would have been paid upon it.

This action by our government and the bank resulted in Haitien

soldiers, on order of a Haitien court, entering the bank and taking some \$70,000. The United States threatened intervention if Haiti repeated this offense. Thereupon the Haitiens proposed to issue bank notes to defray current expenses. The bank protested that the government had not that right because the bank had been granted a monopoly of note issue, and this protest was backed up by our government. However, despite our protest the Haitiens did issue notes to the extent of two million gourdes, a gourde being worth about twenty cents.

As result of embarrassment caused the Haitien government by the bank and by our government, politically ambitious Haitiens, with an eye upon the fat salary received by the Haitien president, began to weigh the chances of overthrowing their government by force and obtaining the presidency for themselves. One Dr. Bobo started a revolution in the north and seized Cape Haitien, but was later driven out by government forces. It was during this disturbance that French marines were landed to protect their consulate, the bank in which their nationals were interested, and the bishopric.

A few months later rebellion sprang up in Port au Prince itself. The president, Sam, fled from his palace and took refuge in the French Legation. There things might have ended but for one of Sam's lieutenants, General Oscar, who had been made commandant of the national prison. Sam had confined in that prison more than a hundred of his political enemies, and, when he was driven from his palace his friend Oscar retaliated by brutally massacring every one of them. The Haitiens were enraged, so much so that they forgot their customary careful

observance of the rights of foreigners, violated the French Legation, seized Sam, cut him to pieces and paraded the streets with portions of his body stuck on poles.

This was the incident for which we had been waiting, which indeed it almost seems we had foreseen, for just at this juncture the American cruiser Washington steamed into Port au Prince. Sailors and marines were immediately landed, the Haitien soldiers and rebels disarmed, and martial law declared. Admiral Caperton hastened to assure the Haitiens that we were there merely to preserve order and help establish a stable government, and that we would leave as soon as that was accomplished. This occupation took place on July 27, 1915.

Sam being dead the Haitien Congress had the task of selecting a new president. There were several candidates, the two principal ones being that same Dr. Bobo who had led the rebellion in the north and one Dartiguenave, leader of the Haitien Senate. Admiral Caperton investigated and conferred with the several candidates and reported to Washington that Dartiguenave was most favorable to our designs. In fact, if elected, he would be willing to grant all our wishes including the Mole St. Nicholas as a naval base. On August 10th Admiral Caperton was advised by the state department that "the United States prefers Dartiguenave."

Two days later the Admiral permitted the Haitien Congress to elect a president. The place of assembly was surrounded by marines, only those having passes signed by Dartiguenave or the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies were permitted to enter. Marines were inside as

well as outside the building and a naval officer, representing Admiral Caperton, was on the floor mixing freely with the Senators and Deputies. Under these circumstances it is slight wonder that the preference of the United States was respected and that Washington's candidate was elected.

Almost immediately the negotiation of a treaty was undertaken. The United States demanded control of Haitien customs, the right to name an American as Haiti's financial adviser charged with preparing the budget and auditing expenses, the right to organize a constabulary officered by Americans to be named by the President of the United States, control of sanitation and public works, the right to intervene and the naming of a commission to pass upon various claims against Haiti.

Again trouble was encountered. The president was willing to sign the treaty but the Haitien Senators were very reluctant indeed to barter away their country's independence. However Admiral Caperton, to use his own words, "exercised military pressure at propitious moments" and on September 8 cabled the State department that he had created a more favorable situation. Meanwhile he had not waited for the treaty to be ratified to seize the Haitien customs houses, and he had also declared martial law, the plain purpose of which was that if any Haitiens forcibly resisted this foreign aggression they might, after drum head court martial, be shot. Despite this pressure, however, things moved too slowly to suit the Americans. The Haitien secretary of state for foreign affairs resigned rather than be a partner to the betrayal of his country, and Dartiguenave was persuaded to appoint

to that office one Louis Borno, a willing tool in Admiral Caperton's hands.

Finally the Admiral, on instructions from Washington, took a decisive step. Stripped of diplomatic camouflage, he presented the Haitien Senate with an ultimatum. Either they ratified the treaty or the United States would set up a military government in Haiti and proceed to run affairs as it pleased. Faced with this situation the Haitien Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 26 to 7 but with interpretative reservations. In February 1916 our own Senate ratified the treaty, which was for ten years, without taking notice of Haiti's reservations. The American Occupation has proceeded as if those reservations did not exist.

In order to proceed as they wished the American Occupation deemed it desirable to give Haiti a new constitution. The old constitution made for Haiti by Haitiens had provisions in it not exactly agreeable to the Americans. Particularly there was that provision prohibiting the ownership of land by aliens. That would prove very embarrassing indeed if it should be discovered that the Haitien mountains contained valuable mineral deposits or that coffee and sugar plantations could be operated in the island profitably. Accordingly it was decided that Haiti should have a new constitution whether Haitiens wished it or not.

A constitution was drawn up by Franklin D. Roosevelt but at this juncture there were rumors that the Haitien Senate was preparing to impeach president Dartiguenave for selling out to the United States.

Accordingly the president was persuaded to dissolve Congress. The lower house was however to meet later as a Constituent Assembly to ratify the new constitution, but, finding sentiment in that body hostile also, the president called for a new election. The newly elected Constituent Assembly proving scarcely more tractable than the old, it also was dissolved by the president.

This left a problem. Here was a nice, brand new constitution with no assembly to ratify it and give the shadow of legality to steps the American Occupation planned. What to do about it was the question. Then Dartiguenave and Admiral Caperton decided upon an ingenious step. They would submit it to the people. Those unlettered Haitians, who, the state and navy departments tell us, are absolutely incapable of self government, were found for the time being to be possessed of quite sufficient intelligence to pass upon a complicated and lengthy constitution. A plebiscite was held on June 12, 1918, and, under military pressure, many Haitians were herded to the polling places, which were in charge of marines. Unable to read, the natives were to deposit a white slip in the ballot box to vote for the constitution, a blue slip if opposed. When a voter entered the polling place he was given a white slip by an armed marine. If he were aware of it and had the courage - and it would have taken a great deal of courage - he could have demanded a blue slip. Few did. The result was announced as 98,294 for the new constitution; 769 against. Such is the expression of popular will in a small nation at an election held under marine auspices.

Under the terms of the original treaty bullied out of Haiti our occupation would have ended in 1926, but in March 1918, which was unseemly haste, American Minister Blanchard negotiated with Louis Borno a treaty extending the original for ten more years, or until 1936. This treaty was never ratified by either the American or the Haitien Senate, and Haitiens claim that we have been in Haiti since 1926 without even a shadow of legal right. The claims seem meritorious.

The Haitien Congress has not been permitted to meet since it proved so recalcitrant about the desired new constitution. Instead a council of state is appointed by the president. This body in turn elects the president. Thus the cards are all stacked to keep the incumbent in office so long as he wishes. There is, however, one fly in the ointment. The president must walk a straight line and follow the wishes of the American Occupation to the letter. This Dartiguenave found out.

In 1920 when Harding was a candidate for the presidency he made a speech at Marion in which he declared: "If I should be elected President xxxxx I will not empower an Assistant Secretary of the Navy to draft a constitution for neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by United States marines." There was much more of the same sort of thing, and poor Dartiguenave swallowed it hook, line and sinker, not recognizing it for what it was, pure campaign bunk. After Harding became President, Dartiguenave wrote him a letter reminding him of that Marion

speech and asking him to make his words good. That of course was not at all according to the rules as we construed the rules. The plea fell upon deaf ears and for his insolence Dartiguenave was defeated for re-election, Louis Borno being chosen in his stead

Haitiens claim that Borno can not legally be president, the constitution providing that the president must be born of a Haitien father. Borno's father was not a Haitien and did not become a naturalized one for a number of years after his son's birth. But what is a constitution between friends?

So much for the reasons why we intervened in Haiti and the legal shams by which we established what is a virtual dictatorship over Haiti's affairs. There remains the manner in which we have carried out the self-imposed trust.

Naturally there were some Haitiens whose opposition to the loss of independence took the form of force. There were too in Haiti certain bands of marauders known as Cacos. Both of these the marines proceeded to put down, and in the putting they do not appear to have been any too careful to distinguish between who was a Caco and who was not. At one time a marine estimate placed the number of Haitiens killed at 3,300. Later this estimated was reduced. It seems safe to say, however, that 2,500 Haitiens met death as a result of American intervention.

To suppress the Cacos and those reputable Haitiens who resented by force of arms the presence of foreign troops on Haitien soil, the marines found communications very unfavorable. There was

scarcely a carriage road in the country, for few Haitiens possessed vehicles of any kind. The marines began to build roads, but found the funds for this purpose limited. Accordingly they revived an old Haitien law, the corvee, which had been inoperative for half a century. This required the natives to work on roads without pay. They were, however, fed.

This procedure while high-handed worked no very serious hardships in the plains, but when the mountainous sections were reached the population was too sparse to provide the needed labor. Then Haitiens from the plains were forced to go to the mountains where they were worked under armed guards and herded into stockades at night. In plain words slavery was temporarily re-established, and when any of the unfortunates attempted to escape they were treated as deserters and shot. That is not a very nice record for a nation which boasts most of that President whom it calls the Great Emancipator.

To aid the marines a native gendarmerie was formed. All the enlisted men are Haitiens, and their loyalty to the marines is secured by a rate of pay which is very high in Haiti. At first these were officered exclusively by marine officers; today most of the officers of the gendarmerie are marine non-commissioned officers and a few are Haitiens. Only one of the latter has risen as high as captain.

When a marine officer was placed on detached service with the Haitien forces he was given temporarily higher rank. The United States continued to pay his regular salary and this was added to by

the Haitien government. Some friction at one time existed between those marine officers who received this temporary increase in rank and pay and those other who remained simply marine officers with their regular rank and pay. It is related that a captain of marines who had been made a colonel of Haiti upon entering a marine mess hall where seating goes by rank, was puzzled to know whether to take his place as a captain or as a colonel. He appealed to the senior officer to know where to sit. That gentleman immediately replied: "If you are a captain of marines, sit accordingly; if you are a Haitien colonel, go out in the kitchen and eat with the other niggers."

The Haitien gendarmerie has been made into a very efficient force. They have aided the marines in putting down disorders and in their other work, including road building. This latter activity, one is inclined to think, was undertaken more to make the marines' task of pacifying the country easier than to give Haiti transportation. However, the roads have been built and are there for the Haitien to use. To some extent at least this has been a benefit to the Haitiens, though there are not wanting some who deny that this is true.

Arguing with a Haitien nationalist, I pointed out to him that he could not deny that the presence of the marines had brought certain benefits to Haiti, and named the roads as one. He promptly took with me. He pointed out that very few Haitiens owned automobiles, or, for that matter, vehicles of any kind; that Haitiens travel afoot or on their tiny donkeys, for both of which means of travel the trails that existed were quite sufficient. Broadening the trails

into roads, he asserted, merely permitted the Americans to dash by in their automobiles, crowding the natives off the road into the brush and covering them with dust. There may be a good deal to that point of view. However, if Haiti progresses, she will need the roads, and they will be of increasing benefit to the natives.

In the matter of sanitation and public health not even the most ardent Haitien nationalist will dispute the good that has been done by the Occupation. Haiti is filled with malaria, consumption and syphilis, particularly the last named. I was told that of patients treated by the American doctors and of prisoners admitted to the national penitentiary ninety per cent were syphiletic. Very considerable progress has been made against these diseases. One of the first steps of course was public sanitation. In 1915 even Port au Prince had no system of sewers. The stench in the city was dreadful, for refuse of all kinds was dumped into open ditches beside the streets. Today there is a system for disposal of wastes and the city is satisfactorily sanitary. Similiar improvements have been made elsewhere. Not only for the immediate benefits, but because of the object lesson, the American program of sanitation is to be commended. What little opposition there is comes from the Haitien doctors, some of whom are said to be very efficient. They oppose socialized medicine on the ground that it deprives them of many patients able to pay for treatment.

The treaty forced out of Haiti does not give the American Occupation direct control of either the schools or the courts, an

oversight which the Americans have regretted. However, American control of finances gives an indirect control of schools and American control of the gendarmerie give a veto power over the Haitien courts.

The Americans have allowed for schools only the amount that was spent prior to the Occupation. The result is that comparatively few Haitien children get an education and the quality of the education that those who do attend school get may be judged from the fact that the pay of Haitien school teachers is six dollars a month. This is only sixty per cent. of the pay of a private in the gendarmerie, and the latter gets in addition his board, room and clothing. More would doubtless be allowed for education if the Haitiens would grant American control, and the stingy policy has perhaps been pursued in the hope of forcing that to be given, but the Haitiens fear that the Occupation would attempt to Americanize the schools and they prefer to retain their French culture.

Haitien judges are elected for life, and this fact has been a thorn in the flesh for the Occupation. Orders of Haitien courts to Haitien officials have sometimes proved embarrassing to the Occupation. However, since the only instrument for enforcing the orders and decisions of the courts is the Haitien gendarmerie, and since that is absolutely controlled by our marines, when the Occupation thinks a court order or decision unwise it is simply ignored. Haitien courts have no authority over members of the Occupation, even though the complainant be a Haitien. For such case the Occupation has its own courts.

The most interesting case from a legal and social standpoint that has arisen during the Occupation is that of one Jolibois, editor of Le Courier Haitien. He was a vigorous opponent of our intervention and violent in his attacks upon the Occupation. Finally he went so far as to accuse General Russell of certain financial irregularities in connection with a \$73,000 flour fund. The accusation was false, but instead of suing Jolibois or proceeding against him in the courts for criminal libel, Gen. Russell had him thrown into prison upon order of the president and held without trial. After a time he was released. Immediately he began to again criticize the Occupation in no uncertain terms. He was again arrested and thrown into prison. And that procedure continued, Jolibois being imprisoned in the expectation that it would make him mend his ways and repeating his offense immediately he was released. He has never been brought to trial, and whatever may be his offense, it is shameful that the power of the United States should be used to deny trial by jury to political enemies.

In the matter of customs control it is claimed that the Occupation has put more business-like systems into effect and has eliminated graft and unfairness which existed under the Haitien regime. However, during the three fiscal years prior to our intervention, which also was during a period of serious domestic disturbances, the annual customs receipts were \$6,325,000; \$5,074,000 and \$5,018,000. During American Occupation the annual receipts have fallen as low as \$3,178,000, but for the fiscal year 1925-26 were \$8,119,000.

Many things can effect the customs, especially where they are in large part export duties as is true in Haiti. World markets, general business depression, poor crop years, changes in customs rates - all these are factors. Owing to the higher purchasing power of the dollar in pre-World War years as compared to post-War years, it would seem too that a customs income of six million in 1913 was a bigger income than eight million in 1926, consequently the better business methods do not seem to have produced much more money, and evidently the customs graft prior to American intervention can not have been great.

There are both import and export duties in Haiti. Of the latter the export duty on coffee is the principal one, it being, unless recently changed, three cents a pound. Since the price of coffee is determined in the world markets, Haiti controlling but a very small part of the supply, it is obvious that the Haitien peasant pays this tax, not the consumer of coffee. Upon the Haitien peasant also falls the burden of the import tax. That tax is levied on the necessities of life which the peasant must buy. At first the luxuries, such as champagne and perfumes, were taxed scarcely at all. Later a revision of the import duties was made so as to partially at least remedy this injustice.

Of course the occupation has had to deal with the three major problems which were the primary causes of our intervention: the national debt, the railroad and the bank. In 1915 the external debt was approximately \$24,000,000, the bonds being owned in France. There

was an internal debt of about \$7,400,000. No interest was paid on these debts for several years after we intervened because the World War curtailed Haitien revenues very decidedly. In 1919, however, a loan of \$40,000,000 was authorized for the purpose of refunding the foreign loans, to meet judgments passed by the Claims Commission, and for public improvements. It was provided also that Americans retain control of the customs until these bonds have been paid, even if that should be after our intervention had ceased.

Because the French franc had depreciated the Financial Adviser deemed it wise to pay off the foreign debt first and \$16,000,000 was borrowed by Haiti from the National City Bank at six per cent interest. However, that bank paid only 92.1 for the Haitien bonds, so that the actual interest rate is  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Haiti could not have borrowed even upon those terms but for our control of her customs, and can not be said to have suffered from the transaction.

With the money borrowed from the National City Bank the Financial Adviser paid off the debt to French bondholders. The money was deposited in the Paris branch of the National City Bank, and because the depreciation of the franc was taken advantage of, the exhorbitant terms upon which the French loan was made to Haiti in 1910 were largely offset. It was far from being a stupid piece of financing, and the Haitiens profitted accordingly.

It is strange, however, that the same astuteness was not displayed in the matter of the railroad bonds. The validity of those

bonds Haiti had been forced to acknowledge, a thing she would not have done but for our intervention, and in 1920 the market price of the bonds on the Paris bourse had fallen to 55 in terms of francs, and because of the depreciation of the franc that meant 27 in terms of dollars. The entire issue could therefore have been purchased for about \$800,000. The accrued interest was at that time about double that amount, and had the Financial Adviser used the same astuteness he displayed in the matter of the French debt half the accrued interest and the whole principal of the bonds would have been saved Haiti. For some reason the opportunity was overlooked or neglected.

Later it developed that a large part of those bonds had come into possession of the National City Bank, which denies it bought them in the Paris market, but rather obtained them as collateral for an unpaid loan. Who the client was is not known outside the bank, but it is quite plain that somebody made around \$2,000,000 on the transaction.

The railroad has been a financial failure, but before the bonds have been paid off it will have cost Haiti about \$8,000,000 in principal and interest. Others have been luckier than Haiti. By friendly suit the railroad went into the hands of a receiver in 1920, and its president, Mr. Farnham of the National City Bank, was made receiver. He charged and received \$25,000 a year for his services and paid a firm of New York lawyers \$20,000 a year for legal advice. Later Mr. Farnham's salary was fixed at \$18,000 a year, which in view of the fact that the total receipts of the railroad are less than

\$90,000 a year and that Mr. Farnham spends but a small part of his time in Haiti seems quite enough. In fact Mr. Farnham has been an expensive luxury for the Haitiens.

The difficulties with the bank were ended by American occupation, but during the war the National City Bank bought out the other American firms' interest in the National Bank of Haiti and after the war purchased the interest of the Banque de L'Union Francais. Because of this changed ownership a new contract was drawn up in 1922 by our state department and the Financial Adviser. In the new contract the rate of interest to be received by the bank, as fiscal agent, is reduced from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 per cent on receipts and expenditures, and the profit from subsidiary coinage goes to the government instead of to the bank. It seems strange, however, that the Financial Adviser permitted Haiti to sign a contract providing for no interest payments on money deposited with the bank. This is very nice for the National Bank of Haiti, which now is owned entirely by the National City Bank of New York. It pays no interest on one million dollars deposited with it by Haiti but loans the money out in Haiti at nine per cent interest. Another three million has been deposited in the National City Bank itself, and it is understood that on it  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent interest is paid, that being less than the current rate in New York.

The National Bank of Haiti has the potentiality of large profits from the monopoly given it of note issue. In Haiti when loans are made to merchants or others it is not customary to give a credit on

the bank's books to be checked against. Instead banknotes are loaned. Against these loans of banknotes, for which an average of nine per cent discount is charged, the bank must maintain a reserve of one-third. It need not, however, be in gold but only in American money, and half of it may be on deposit in the United States, drawing interest. See how nicely this works. The bank deposits \$1,000 in the United States at three per cent, places another thousand in its own vaults, against these it issues six thousand in banknotes to loan out at nine per cent thus realizing a gross profit of 28.5 per cent. on its actual investment.

The Claims Commission in the four years from 1923-26 inclusive examined claims against Haiti amounting to approximately \$40,000,000. Less than ten per cent of these were allowed. It is very likely that had Haiti been compelled to deal with these claims herself she would have been forced to allow a much larger per cent than that because many of the claims were by foreigners who would have had the backing of their governments. The Claims Commission has done excellent work, and its expenses have been reasonable.

That the American Occupation has been productive of some benefits to the mass of Haitien people is undeniable. Energies that had been wasted in civil conflict have been freed for productive occupation. Corruption in public office, of which there had been much in Haiti, has been in large degree if not altogether prevented, thus giving the Haitien people more for their taxes. But of course the Occupation claims the most possible. In the most recent report of General Russell he points to the fact that the rural population is better clothed, fed

and housed than in the past as proof of increased prosperity on the peasant farms; and as for the urban population, their prosperity, he declares, is demonstrated by the phenomenal increase in automobile sales.

Let it not be supposed, however, that there is prosperity in Haiti in the American sense. Here there is an automobile for every 5.3 persons. I doubt if there is one for every five thousand in Haiti. The average annual income per capita of Haitians, I have seen stated, is only twenty dollars. Though that seems impossible in a land where the weekly wage of unskilled labor is as much, I am prepared to believe it. A gentleman with whom I dined in Port au Prince told me he paid his domestic servants twenty cents a day, out of which sum they purchased their own food. That is an annual income of only \$73 - and his domestics had the appearance of being less poverty stricken than the mass of Haitians.

In no small degree, I think, this cheapness of labor in Haiti explains why Americans there in connection with the Occupation so thoroughly approve of our having intervened. The climate is very agreeable, and, Haiti being very mountainous, even the hot summer months can be very pleasant spent in the higher altitudes. Labor being so inexpensive, so also are the products of labor. The Americans, however, are paid in American dollars according to American standards. A marine officer, whose salary certainly would not permit him to live in luxury in his native land, finds that its purchasing power is so much greater in Haiti that he can live in a style that

is not at all uncomfortable. Naturally that is not displeasing either to him or his family.

At very best there has been much in our dealings with Haiti of which we have no right to be proud. It might not, however, be a so serious matter if it were an isolated case. But is there any reason to believe that our intervention in the Dominican Republic was actuated by any motives higher than those which carried us into Haiti? Is there reason to believe that a marine-controlled election in Nicaragua will be any more an honest expression of the popular will than was the marine-controlled plebiscite in Haiti? Is it not more likely that the case of Haiti is fairly representative of our policy in the whole Carribean and in Central America?

And who is responsible? In Haiti we first injected ourselves during a Republican administration; a succeeding Democratic administration did the actual intervening and accomplished the Occupation; two Republican administrations have continued the Occupation without in any way lessening the American dictatorship or changing policies. Apparently the political complexion of the administration has little to do with the matter. One wonders whether any of the Presidents during whose administrations these things have occurred had very much time in the great press of presidential affairs to give thought to Haiti. And the information reaching the President comes through a state department which for decades seems to have desired extension of American control in the Carribean.

These things suggest to me that perhaps our foreign policy in those quarters at least is more determined by our professional diplomats who remain through successive administrations than by our elected officials or appointed cabinet members. If army officers, having built up a fighting machine, want to see how the thing works - and that is a rather popular impression - is it any less likely that the professional diplomats seek opportunity to see the diplomatic machine work?

Despite promises to get out, we apparently are in the Philippines to stay. Only very recently did we withdraw from the Dominican Republic, over which we still exercise considerable control by reason of having its customs in our hands. We are in Nicaragua where, there is grave reason to suspect, we are keeping in power a government which could not stand on its own feet. This record has undeniably made us feared and disliked throughout Latin-America. May it not be doing us even more damage at home? How long can a nation follow an imperialistic policy and remain true to the original American conceptions? It is conceivable that we are approaching the point where we will have to decide whether we shall be an empire or a democracy.

The danger, too, extends to our world policy. One thing that actuated some Americans in their opposition to the United States joining the League of Nations was the possibility of being embarrassed by our Haitian policy. Haiti is a member of the League. Had we joined, how could one league member have explained the fact that it had deprived another member of its independence? It seems to me a very doubtful state

of affairs when a powerful banking house, the influence of which with our government can not be small, may possibly be made to throw that influence against a movement for world peace because of its own material interest in having the United States pursue an imperialistic policy in the Carribean. That there is honest difference of opinion as to the wisdom of our entrance into the League I do not for one moment deny, and I do not wish to imply that I think the National City Bank alone could keep the United States out. But if conditions are such that that big business may have been influenced to oppose the league because of its Haitien interests, there is danger that some other powerful business is in the same boat because of the Dominican Republic, a third because of Nicaragua, and so on. Where there is honest division of sentiment, the united influence of several powerful business interests one way or the other might easily determine our course -- and that is not a desirable thing.

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