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This paper, NAPOLEON REDIVIVUS, was written for the Sphex Club of Lynchburg and was read before the Club the evening of May 12, 1961.

The following works were consulted in the writing of the paper:

Official Records of the War of the Rebellion

Alfred Roman, Military Operations of General Beauregard

Hamilton Basso, Beauregard, The Great Creole

Douglas Southall Freeman, Robert E. Lee and Lee's Lieutenants

T. Harry Williams, P. G. T. Beauregard, Napoleon in Gray (My title, Napoleon Redivivus, had already been chosen when I first saw Mr. William's book.)

G. L. Barton, Jr.
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Also read before the Lynchburg Civil War Round Table, Nov. 17, 1961.

NAPOLEON REDIVIVUS

A few years after the close of the War between the States, an elderly Creole gentleman in Louisiana was talking to a visitor from Virginia. The talk inevitably turned upon the late unpleasantness and, in the course of the conversation, the Virginian mentioned a certain General Lee. The Creole hesitated a moment. "Lee?" he said, "Lee? Ah, yes, I remember now. I have heard General Beauregard speak well of him."

To understand the point of view of the Creole gentleman whose remark I have just quoted, one must bear in mind that he was born a French subject rather than a citizen of our United States, and that his background and early surroundings were far more Parisian than American, much more Gallic than Anglo-Saxon. To such a one the gallant and Gallic Beauregard would understandably be the general par excellence of the Confederate States Army and his approval of a brother officer would, in the eyes of a Louisianian, accord that officer a true accolade.

Just fifteen years after the ink of Talleyrand's signature had dried on the treaty which transferred from the ownership of France to that of the United States the bit of this earth known as the Louisiana Purchase, there was born on a plantation near the city of New Orleans a child to whom was given the resounding name of Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beauregard, an entitlement whose length and whose foreign sound were to become, apparently, a source of some embarrassment to him. For, as he entered West Point, he dropped the inherited hyphen and thenceforth signed his name, not P. G. Toutant-Beauregard, but simply P. G. T. Beauregard. Later, as a commissioned officer in the United States Army, he decided that three initials were one too many (for the American way of life) and began to sign his name G. T. Beauregard, a practice which he continued to the end of his life. There is extant today a letter from the Adjutant General's office calling his attention to the discrepancy in his signatures and requesting an explanation.

There is not space, within the limits of this paper, for a detailed account of Beauregard's ancestry; the one important fact to bear in mind is that he was by descent wholly French. French was not only his native language, but, until he was about twelve years old, it was his only language. He subsequently acquired a splendid command of English, - witness his copious letters and reports, - but all his life he spoke English with a slight yet noticeable French accent. As a child, he attended a school near New Orleans at which all the classes were conducted in French. Here, in addition to the usual secular studies, he learned his catechism, - learned it so well and so promptly that at the early age of ten and a half years he was able to qualify before his priest for his First Communion.

But on the day set for his First Communion there entered in a strange and discordant note. As young Pierre left his pew and, with the other children, started towards the altar rail, there suddenly broke in upon the solemn silence of the church the spirited beating of a drum. Now came real temptation to the lad, to whom guns and horses and all the trappings of the military had been a passion from his earliest years. He wavered while the other children continued to walk to the sanctuary; he started again to join them. The drum drew nearer and louder, and at length, he turned and fled from the church, in his eagerness to view the passing troops.

His family - his mother especially - felt keenly disgraced. Yet, in a way perhaps faintly ironical, one may wonder whether this was not an appropriate first Communion for the lad who was to attend the United States Military Academy against the strongly expressed wishes of his very French grandfather and be graduated from the Academy second in his class; for the lad who was to be wounded and twice brevetted for gallantry in the Mexican War; for the lad who was to be for five days the Superintendent of West Point; who was to become the first general officer to be commissioned in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States of America;

who was to direct the firing of the guns which ushered in the Civil War; who commanded the Southern forces at First Manassas, who planned and fought the first great battle in the West at Shiloh, who for two years defended Charleston from attack by sea, and who finally, in the waning months of the War, was to direct the defense of the southern approaches to Richmond. Let it be said here, however, that, despite his defection on the day set for his First Communion, he remained a loyal Roman Catholic all his life.

Before he reached West Point, however, he had several years of schooling in New York City, which exerted a considerable influence upon his subsequent life and career. It was here that he came under the guidance of two men, the French brothers Peugnet, who had been officers under Napoleon, one a captain of artillery, the other a captain of cavalry. In their conversations with young Toutant-Beauregard, they relived the glories of their campaigns and battles under Napoleon, and the younger man caught some of the fire of his tutors. From this time forward, he read avidly all that he could of Napoleon's methods of handling troops on the field of battle. From Napoleon it was an easy step to the writings of Jomini, Napoleon's chief of staff and the foremost French writer on military strategy, a man whose thinking strongly influenced French warfare even as late as the outbreak of the Second World War. Beauregard never wavered in his worship of these two idols, and one cannot escape the feeling that much of the self-assurnace which characterized his conduct in the Civil War (and even prior to that, in the Mexican War) was due to his belief that he was so thoroughly versed in the doctrines of Napoleon and his chief of staff, so permeated with the lessons which he had absorbed from their experiences, that he was, for all practical purposes, a reincarnation of the great French soldier. Unmistakable traces of such a feeling one finds running through his battle plans and his subsequent reports of battles fought.

(and who was imbued with the unshakable belief that, given the opportunity, he would become a great soldier.

So went to West Point in 1834 a lad who at sixteen was fired with the ambition of becoming a great soldier. Four years later he was graduated second in his class of forty-five cadets. Here he had known, in his own class or in earlier classes, men who would serve with him in the Confederate Army, among them Jubal Early, Richard Ewell, and his own worst enemy in the C.S. A., Braxton Bragg. Here too he had been associated with future enemies, - Joe Hooker, Henry W. Halleck, W. T. Sherman. His favorite teacher ~~thm~~ at the Point was Robert Anderson, the man who was destined, in the opening scene of the War, to refuse to surrender Fort Sumter to his former pupil. The relationship between the two must have been close, for Beauregard immdeiately after graduation served for a time as Anderson's assistant.

Upon graduation Beauregard was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers and, after his brief service as Anderson's assistant, he served various assignments in the construction of coastal defences and in topographic and hydrographic surveys. Just as the Mexican War broke out, he ~~was~~ had some hope of being able to transfer from Engineers to Field Artillery - always his first love - with the rank of ~~captain~~ ~~first lieutenant (he had asked for a captaincy)~~ captain, but in this he was disappointed. In this war he was twice brevetted for "gallant and meritorious service," once as a captain and, later, at Chapultepec, as a major. Two years later he learned, to his "utter surprise and mortification" that two officers of the Corps of Engineers (Lee and Tower) had received three brevets. Thoroughly indignant, he sat him down and wrote a letter to Major General P. F. Smith, who happened to be visiting inWashington at that time.

"Of these two" who were thrice brevetted, he wrote, "I was not one. I had up to that period thought and believed that our friend Lee was the only one who had received three brevets and consequently I was perfectly satisfied in having been brevetted but twice; for in my estimation he was fully entitled to one more than I was - and for that reason I refused to avail myself of the offers made to me by my friends here to have another conferred upon me." / After

having stated carefully and in detail his reasons for believing that he was entitled to the third honor, he closes his letter to General Smith with these words: "I wish then, my dear Genl, should you have the opportunity and find no objection to doing so, to lay the matter before them and the Secretary of War to test whether it is ever too late to do one justice when one is clearly and unquestionably entitled to it." Here we see clearly the forerunner of the kind of writing and thinking which would later have an unhappy effect upon his career as a general in the Confederate States Army. Out of this came a hatred of General Scott and a queer refusal to recognize the latter's military prowess in the Mexican War.

After the Mexican War came a decade and more of assignments to Engineering projects. During much of this time he was stationed in or near New Orleans, where he ran for mayor in 1858 on a ticket got up and supported by a combination of Whigs and Democrats. He lost to the better organized and already entrenched Know-Nothing Party but the campaign must have been quite an exciting affair in the city which at best has never been noted for the purity of its politics. Later Captain Beauregard told an army friend that he was sorry to think that he had almost sacrificed his commission in an endeavor to help such a disgusting city as New Orleans.

In the late 1850's, if one may judge by his letters, Beauregard seemed singularly untouched by the threats of secession which were heard throughout the South. This apathy toward the great political question of the day may have been due largely to his own manouvering in army politics; he was eager to be assigned to duty as superintendent of the Academy at West Point. So well did he manouver that, with the assistance of his brother-in-law, Senator Slidell, he was able to defeat the plans of the then Senator Jefferson Davis and obtain the coveted assignment. This was the first of his conflicts with Davis, conflicts which continued in an almost unbroken stream until they were at last terminated by the death of Davis in 1889.

Beauregard's orders to proceed to West Point were issued in November, 1860, to become effective in January, 1861. In view of the then political situation, it seems almost unbelievable that Beauregard could even have thought of going to the Academy, or that he could for a moment suppose that the government would permit him to hold the office. Yet he did go. On his way he stopped in Washington to see the Adjutant General. He told General Totten that, if Louisiana should secede and there should be war between North and South, he would feel in honor bound to resign his commission and go with his native state. He assumed the superintendency of West Point Jan. 23, 1861. Almost at once a cadet from Louisiana came to him and asked if he, the cadet, should resign. Beauregard replied, "Watch me; and when I jump, you jump. What's the use of jumping too soon?"

Beauregard's West Point orders were revoked January 24, the day after he had assumed command. Louisiana seceded from the Union January 26. Beauregard reqlinquished his command January 28. One may assume that the Louisiana cadet jumped withhim.

What followed was unusual but it is revealing. Beauregard wrote General Totten a curious letter of protest about his removal from the West Point command. Surely, he said, Totten could not have removed him merely because of their private talks in Washington. Surely Totten would understand that he had no intention of resigning his commission unless Lousiana should secede and war should ensue. "So long as I remain in the service, " he wrote, "I shall be most scrupulous in the performance of all my obligations to the Govt. So long as I keep my opinions of the present unfortunate condition of our country to myself, I must respectfully protest against any act of the War Dept. that might cast any improper reflection upon my reputation or position in the Corps of Engineers." A strange point of view, and equally strange was Beauregard's attempt to obtain a mileage payment of $165 from the government for his return trip from West Point to New Orleans. The government, of course, refused to pay

but, even after he had resigned his commission in the United States Army and had accepted a commission as a brigadier general in the provisional army of the Confederacy and was actually in command of a force which was menacing a Federal garrison in Charleston harbor, he continued to press upon Washington the justice of his claim for mileage.

Upon his arrival in New Orleans, Beauregard at once began to issue to the state military authorities a stream of advice in regard to defense against Federal naval attacks on the city, and he took pains to see that his recommendations reached the new Confederate government at Montgomery, Alabama. He had great hopes of being appointed commander of the Louisiana state army which the legislature had just authorized, and he was both disappointed and disgusted when that post was assigned to another man. The new commander was Braxton Bragg, the man who would prove to be Beauregard's bête noire in the Confederacy. Beauregard refused the offer of a colonel's commission to serve under Bragg. In one of his characteristic flourishes, he wrote to several friends that his services were at the command of his state "even unto death" (the words are his own) but without rank, and he forthwith enlisted as a private in the Orleans Guards, a battalion of Creole aristocrats. After he had become a general officer in the Confederate service and had gone far afield, his name was still carried on the rolls of the battalion, and when it was reached at roll-call, the color sergeant would answer "Absent on duty."

But Beauregard, of course, had no real intention of serving anywhere as a private soldier. On February 10th he wrote a letter to Jefferson Davis, congratulating him upon his election as President of the Comfederate States of America and asking for an appointment in the Confederate States Army. His brother-in-law, Slidell, and other political friends supported his request and late in February, Secretary of War L. P. Walker invited Beauregard to Montgomery for a conference with President Davis. He reached Montgomery Febraary 26th. The next day he learned that he was going to Charleston as

the Confederacy's first brigadier general.

The choice of Beauregard for this assignment was probably prompted by several considerations. The situation at Charleston was a delicate one. Confederate commissioners were then in Washington demanding that Fort Sumter be turned over to their government. If this demand should be refused, then a military demand must be made for the surrender of the Fort. Should this demand be made by the State of South Carolina or by the central Confederate government? Obviously, it must emanate from the Confederacy itself. Then, if this demand for surrender should be refused, the military operations against the Fort must be conducted by the Confederacy and must be in charge of a skillful and experienced officer; the Confederate government could not afford to let its first military effort be bungled by some state politician. Beauregard was clearly the answer to Davis' problems. He had a reputation; he was an excellent engineer; he had a personality that would probably impress even Charlestonians. And so to Charleston he went, in an ecstasy of glory and rhetoric. And last the flood tide of his destiny was rolling in.

The details of the reduction of Fort Sumter have been narrated too often to bear repetition here. In my opinion, one does not underrate Beauregard or detract from his ability when one says that any competent engineer or artillery officer could have accomplished the same result. But this was the South's first military exploit and hence the reduction of Fort Sumter turned Beauregard overnight into a Confederate hero, the first paladin of ~~the~~ the South. President Davis, Secretaries Walker and Benjamin and other political figures, the Confederate Congress, the legislature of South Carolina, the press throughout the South, - all these joined in praising to the skies the man under whose direction such a blow had been inflicted upon the arrogant North. The applause of the people of Charleston completed the halo of glory which hovered over the Creole general's head. Beauregard accepted the adulation modestly and immediately set about rearranging the armament of

Charleston to repel a possible Federal Attack.

An English war correspondent, William Howard Russell, was in Charleston at this time. If he has reported accurately his many conversations with Beauregard, the latter's ideas, plans and opinions must have varied greatly from day to day. He apparently recognized the overall strategic importance to the South of retaining control of the Mississippi River and seemed to hope that he himself would be assigned to the general command of that area. During the first week in May he went to Montgomery for a conference with Davis and Walker. In this conference he had his first military clash with Davis and displayed a tendency to lecture the government on how to conduct the war, a tendency which grew more noticeable as the months passed into years. After the conference, he returned to Charleston to resume work on the coastal defences north and south of the city. On May 26th he received orders placing him in command of the defences of the Mississippi River from Vicksburg to the borders of Kentucky and Tennessee.

He was ready to leave at once but, before he left, he treated Charleston to a rhetorical flourish by which its citizens might remember him. In a farewell address to the soldiers who had served there under him, he said that he was sorry to leave Charleston, for he had come to look upon it as a second home; that he had hoped to go to Virginia but his services seemed needed elsewhere, and thither he would go with the resolve to deal firmly with the enemies of the South, should they dare to pollute its soil with their dastardly feet. Finally, addressing his closing paragraphs to a wider audience, he exhorted:

" . . whatever happens at first, we are certain to triumph at last, even if we had for arms only pitchforks and flintlock muskets, for every bush and haystack will become an ambush and every barn a fortress. The history of nations proves that a gallant and free people, fighting for their independence and firesides,

are invincible against even disciplined mercenaries, at a few dollars per month. What, then must be the result when its enemies are little more than an armed rabble, gathered together hastily on a false pretense, and for an unholy purpose, with an octogenarian at its head? None but the demented can doubt the result." One adds the comment, perhaps a bit ruefully, What a wonderful minister of propaganda Beauregard would have made. But to Mississippi he did not go. His classmate, McDowell, was waiting for him on the banks of the Potomac.

Despite the fact that Beauregard came to Richmond without a definite assignment (he was merely summoned there for a conference with President Davis), his journey to Richmond was one continuing ovation. Crowds begged for a glimpse of him at every stop along the railroads. In Richmond, a crowd with a brass band and a special carriage met him at the station. Facile as he was with a pen, Beauregard was no speechmaker and he eluded the crowd by riding to his hotel in a private carriage. This made a good impression; people assumed that he was more interested in defeating the Yankees than he was in receptions.

The next day (May 31) he had a conference with Davis and Robert E. Lee. The latter had just returned from Manassas Junction and had pointed out to Davis the probability that McDowell, operating from the Alexandria area, would strike at Manassas. Davis at once decided to send Beauregard there. He reached his new post the night of June 2nd, and the next morning he assumed command of what his orders called "the Alexandria line." The troops were delighted to have such a well known hero as their commander.

The next few weeks were spent chiefly in two fields of endeavor, one of which reflects great credit upon Beauregard the troop commander, while the other adds nothing to his reputation as a strategist. He quickly enhanced the morale of the 6,000 men who composed his army at first, and, as recruits and reinforcements arrived, he rapidly reduced them to discipline. In a remarkably short time he created an effective fighting force. As any good field commander would do, he worked hard for the provisioning, welfare and comfort of

his men. This, unhappily, led to endless bickering correspondence with the utterly incompetent Commissary General Northrup. In the field of strategy, however, Beauregard's writings and actions border on the fantastic. (Here let me remark, parenthetically, that at this point in Beauregard's career nearly every writer who treats of him in any detail begins to use the adjective "Napoleonic.") Almost daily he sent to Richmond a new plan for what he proposed to do in the Manassas area. One day he would be highly optimistic, sure of brilliant victory and glory; the next day he would be in the depths of despair, sure of defeat unless he were heavily reinforced. All his battle plans, including those which advocated a retreat to Richmond and a last-ditch stand there, exhibited a complete disregard of logistics, a total ignorance of the limitations imposed upon a field commander by an inexperienced and untrained staff too small in numbers for the task. Nevertheless, plan after plan went to Richmond - one plan went orally by special courier, Colonel James Chestnut - and all were rejected by President Davis with a tactfulness which he did not always use towards his subordinates. Davis, in rejecting several of the plans, pointed out to Beauregard that he had built the hoped-for success of his plan entirely upon the assumption that the enemy would do exactly what he wanted them to do, an assumption that has been the downfall of more than one would-be master of strategy.

First Manassas, as the battle which ensued on July 21, 1861, is generally known in the South, was an amazing record of bungled orders, indifferent staff work, sudden shifts in strategy and, finally, fortunate victory for the gray clad legions. Beauregard's star was now at its zenith. Before breakfast on the day following the battle, he received from Davis a note of congratulation which ended with these words " . . . you are appointed to be 'General' in the army of the Confederate States of America, and with the consent of the Congress, will be duly commissioned accordingly." This placed Beauregard among the highest officers of the Confederate Army; only four men now outranked him:

Adjutant General Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, and Joseph Eggleston Johnston. The people of the South applauded him even more lavishly than after his reduction of Fort Sumter. He was the great captain of the Confederacy, the sure and certain hope of its independence. Songs and marches were composed in his honor and dedicated to him, such as the "Beauregard-Manassas Quick-Step" and "General Beauregard's grand polka militaire." Babies, race horses, steamboats and even female garments were named for him. A Richmond editor, surveying all this adulation, bestowed upon him the title of Beauregard Felix. This classical-minded journalist was more apt than he probably realized. Beauregard had indeed been lucky at both Sumter and Manassas. The gods of chance had sided with him on both these occasions.

In the months after Manassas, Beauregard first showed definite symptoms of a weakness that was destined to have a most untoward effect upon his career and his reputation. For then flowered fully his unhappy passion for the use of the pen, his eagerness to get his opinions on paper, especially newspaper, and his zeal in doing so. ~~One Southern general later remarked that ink flowed in his veins instead of blood.~~ Some people claimed that he spent more time and energy in fighting Richmond with angry letters than he did with muskets in fighting the boys in blue. It is true, of course, that there were other generals on both sides who suffered from this same disease. And in the end, this trait ruined them with their civil superiors.

It is, unfortunately, not possible within the compass of this paper to give an account of the writings and manouverings of Beauregard during the last five months of the year 1861. One can only mention his letters to friends who were now members of the Confederate Congress, letters which he was sure would be read to the Congress; his flaming quarrel with the imcompetent and often irritating Commissary General; his running epistolary fight with Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin, a fight in which he for once met his match, and more than his match - as a letter writer; his indirect efforts to have the War Department consider him at least equal to Joe Johnston in command rank; and, finally, his official

report, dated October 14th, of the Battle of Manassas. To this official 9,000-word report he, strangely enough, prefixed a full and detailed account of the battle-plan (as he called it) which he had sent to Richmond orally by Colonel Chestnut and which Davis and Lee had rejected. Davis had been trying, with a patience somewhat unusual to him, to mediate between Beauregard and Secretary Benjamin. Beauregard's official report reached Richmond just as his dispute with Benjamin reached its most acute stage. To add fuel to the already blazing fire, the War Department, with its customary inefficiency, neglected to forward the report to President Davis and the latter first learned of its existence through a "synopsis," short and apparently somewhat garbled, printed in the Richmond Dispatch for October 23, 1861. The President's temper had already snapped over one of Beauregard's letters to Benjamin, and now his wrath mounted even higher. He wrote Beauregard that the official report sounded like an attempt "to exalt yourself at my expense," and Beauregard promptly fired back with a letter to the editors of the Richmond Whig headed "Centreville, Va., Within hearing of the Enemy's Guns, Nov. 3, 1861." After some further recriminations and after an anti-administration group had endeavored to draw Beauregard into their midst as their leader and as a candidate for the presidency in the approaching election, the administration decided to remove him from such close letter-range by transferring him to the western theater of the War. The move suited Beauregard, since he had for some time felt that he was only a corps commander rather than an army commander. Benjamin had sorely irritated him by writing to him: "You are second in command of the whole Army of the Potomac, and not first in command of half of the Army." Beauregard at once wrote to Davis, asking the latter to shield him "from these ill-timed unaccountable annoyances." He left the Virginia army February 2, 1862, after a display of oratory in a farewell address to his troops. On the evening of February 4th he met for the first time the man under whom he would serve, General Albert Sidney Johnston.

Then ensued on Sundaym April 6, one of the most bitterly argued engagements of the War, the Battle of Shiloh. Beauregard and Johnston had had many conversations and some arguments before the battle and as a result of these, Beauregard had drawn up a compact plan of organization of the army into three corps under Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee, with Breckinridge in command of a reserve corps. Beauregard was second in command of the whole army and Bragg, commanding by far the largest of the three corps, also acted as cheif of staff to Johnston.

Even Albert Sidney Johnston's most ardent supporters admit that Beauregard made the plans for the Battle of Shiloh and, since Johnston was mortally wounded and died before the day's fighting had come to a close, the burden of responsibility rests upon Beauregard. The most optimistic can only say that it was another of the South's long series of victories on the actual field of Battle not pursued to a decisive conculsion. The loss of Fort Donaldson and of Island No. 10 followed closely upon the heels of Shiloh and weakened the South's hold on the great river. Donelson fell Feb. 15, nearly 2 months before Shiloh. GLB

All this, and the events which followed during the summer of 1862 added little to Beauregard's fame. His withdrawal to Corinth and then to Tupelo, Mississippi, was probably justified but, coming as it did close upon the heels of what had been widely acclaimed as a brilliant victory, it was difficult to explain. His rhetoric was put to a severe test. In a long letter to the Mobile Regsiter, one of his most rhetorical utterances, he blistered the Northern generals, Pope and Halleck, for making false claims of losses inflicted upon his army, and then went on to say: "The retreat was conducted with great order and precision, doing much credit to the officers and men under my orders, and must be looked upon, in every respect, by the country, as equivalent to a brilliant victory." Then sickness probably led him into another difficult situation, - at least, sickness is the most charitable explanation of his having left his command without obtaining permission from the War Department and without even notifying the Department of his action. Some

critics would also make much of the fact that, while on leave, he met the novelist Augusta J. Evans, and thus made an acquaintance which quickly flowered into an intimate friendship, one which lasted long after the war had ended.

The administration in Richmond took a very dim view of all this. Davis' friends had been openly critical of Beauregard ever since Shiloh and soon Mrs. Mary Boykin Chestnut confided to her sharp and caustic diary, "Cock Robin is as dead as he ever will be now." After an exchange of letters and telegrams, Davis sent a special aide, Colonel W. P. Johnston, the son of General Albert Sidney Johnston, to inspect Beauregard's army and to propound to him a series of searching questions concerning his movements during the few weeks just preceding. In the meantime Davis inveigled Governor Pickens of South Carolina into asking for Beauregard as a replacement for General John C. Pemberton as commander of the coastal defences around Charleston. And on June 20th, less than three months after the Battle of Shiloh, President Davis appointed Braxton Bragg to be permanent commander of the Western Department. He then and later defended his action on the ground that Beauregard had, in effect, deserted his army. Finally, on August 29th, after Beauregard had recovered his health and after he had written some very bitter letters, he was assigned to the command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, with headquarters at Charleston. He arrived there September 15th and received a warm welcome from Governor Pickens and the people of Charleston.

For nearly eighteen months (Sept. 15, 1862 - April 20, 1864) Beauregard skillfully defended Charleston from the Federal attempts to take the city. Although this is one of the most interesting and effective periods of his Civil War record, we shall have to give it but brief notice. He strengthened the defenses of Charleston and its area by skillfully placing his guns so as to bear on an approaching fleet. He managed to obtain some additional troops but not enough, in his opinion, to defend successfully the line from Charleston to Savannah. On April 6, 1863, his guns, with an accuracy amazing for the age,

repelled a vigorous attack from Admiral Du Pont's squadron of nine ironclads, a victory which once more aroused in Beauregard's heart the hope of obtaining command of a field army, and prompted him to produce again a plan of grand strategy that would surely and quickly win the war for the Confederacy. He also tried his hand at diplomacy; after the repulse of Du Pont's squadron, Beauregard proclaimed that the blockade of Charleston had been lifted and he invited foreign commerce to enter the port. The results of this proclamation caused Beauregard to seem slightly foolish. About this time, when General Lee was planning his incursion into Maryland and Pennsylvania which terminated in the Battle of Gettysburg, he suggested that Beauregard and most of his troops be moved to Northern Virginia to threaten Washington while he was invading the North. Beauregard sidestepped this proposal by saying that the enemy in front of him was about to attack and that all his troops were needed in South Carolina. He did not intend to go anywhere in a minor subordinate capacity. Later, on July 10, just after Gettysburg, the Federal forces under General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren, launched a combined land and sea attack on Charleston. The bombardment was continued until early September. The night of September 7th, Dahlgren tried to enter the harbor in small boats. Sumter had been battered but it was still a formidable barrier to the Blue forces. For the next two months the Federals were very quiet. In the surcease, Beauregard turned again to recommendations of grand strategy and also to some interesting experiments with torpedo boats. And President Davis was never far from his thoughts. After the Confederate Congress had passed a resolution praising Beauregard for his defence of the city, and after Davis had negelected to mention the name Beauregard in a speech which he made in Charleston, Beauregard wrote to the friend who had sent him a copy of the Congressional resolution: "How different is the action of the legislators from the jealousy of the President. The curse of God must have been on our people when we chose him out of so many noble sons of the South who would have carried us safely through this Revolution."

Dismissing in these few words Beauregard's excellent defence of Charleston, we now follow him as he returns to Virginia. Early in 1864 Longstreet tried his hand at grand strategy and proposed a combination of forces to invade Kentucky in a smashing offensive under Joe Johnston, Beauregard and Longstreet himself. Everybody concerned, except Longstreet, turned thumbs down on such a complicated movement; even Beauregard admitted that it was logistically unsound, if not impossible of execution. Soon thereafter Beauregard applied for sick leave; he was suffering from his chronic throat ailment and he felt sure that the Federal forces before Charleston would be inactive for some time. No reply came to his request for leave. Instead, there came a telegram from Bragg, now military adviser to President Davis with the rank of general-in-chief; Bragg wanted to know if Beauregard would come to Virginia to serve in the field. On April 4th he answered: "Am ready to obey any order for the good of the service." He was ordered to Weldon, North Carolina, where further orders would be sent to him. He reached Weldon April 23rd, just as General Grant was making his final preparations for his far-reaching sidling movement southward. Wilderness and Spotsylvania, Mule Shoe and Bloody Angle, Yellow Tavern and Jeb Stuart's death, - all were to fall within three weeks after Beauregard arrived at Weldon.

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The orders awaiting him there assigned him to the command of the Department of North Carolina and Cape Fear. This included that part of Virginia which lies south of the James River. When Beauregard assumed command on April 23rd, he renamed the Department, apparently on no authority other than his own, the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. His mission was to protect and hold the southern approaches to Richmond against Federal attacks which might come from the coast, especially along the James River. His department was large, its boundaries vaguely defined, the command responsibility in it was seriously confused and confusing. Especially

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to be noted is the indefiniteness regarding Drewry's Bluff, that heavily fortified point which guarded the river approach to Richmond.

After reaching Weldon on April 23rd, Beauregard acted like a model subordinate. His reports to Richmond were prompt. His requests were restrained and subsequent events showed that they were based upon a sound evaluation of the situation. In one of his letters to Bragg he wrote, sensibly enough, that events might make it necessary for him to conduct some operations north of the James River and hence in an area under General Lee's command. And in such a case, he continued, he would be glad to serve under Lee: "I would take pleasure in aiding him to crush our enemies and achieve the independence of our country." In due course this letter came to the President's desk for endorsement. Davis apparently boiled over. Angily he wrote on the letter: "I did not doubt the readiness of General Beauregard to serve under any General who ranks him. The right of General Lee to command would be derived from his superior rank." Thus continued the feud!

For reasons which are not clear - sickness may have been one reason - Beauregard did not reach Petersburg until May 10th, eighteen days after his arrival at Weldon. In the meantime, on May 5th, 22,000 men under "Beast" Butler came up the James on transports and on May 6th seized City Point, an ideal base from which to operate against Petersburg and the railroads. Instead of staying there, however, Butler landed most of his troops at Bermuda Hundred. This movement caught the Richmond government off guard; Grant's pounding at the front door had diverted attention from the needs of the back yard. Correspondence between Beauregard and Bragg fully bears out this inference.

To meet the threat posed by Butler's landing, Beauregard disposed his troops to good advantage and made efforts to obtain reinforcements. He finally came to Petersburg on May 10th, just as Lee and Grant were locked in the carnage of Spotsylvania Court House. Beauregard bottled up Butler and

his men in Bermuda Hundred andthen turned his attention again to grand strategy. He devised and offered to Richmond several plans which, he was sure, would lead to brilliant success and independence. It was a repetition of the planning that followed First Manassas and it met with the same objections - and rejections. Nevertheless, his diagnoses of the situations which successively confronted him were sound, and it is perhaps true that he divined Grant's intentions of crossing the James and of assailing Petersburg earlier than did General Lee. The latter knew that Grant was pulling out his troops but he was for a few days uncertain for what destination or prupose; Beauregard, being on the "receiving" end, had better opportunities to learn what troops were opposing him. His telegrams to Lee, however, were brief and vague but finally both he and Lee were sure that Grant and his army were south of the James River. Then began the actual siege of Petersburg, a situation which Lee had tried desperately to avoid. To Beauregard belongs the credit for keeping the Federals out of Petersburg and even a somewhat unsympathetic critic refers to this operation as "Beauregard's finest battle."

Under the conditions of the siege operations, Beauregard was not a happy man. He was a full general serving under the command of another full general and, as such, he must either execute plans devised by Lee or obtain Lee's approval of any plans that he himself might make. The failure, late in June, of a counterattack made by Beauregard's troops, his subordinate position at The Crater on July 30th, his failure (probably not his fault) to clear the Petersburg-Weldon Railroad of the enemy, - all these contributed to his unhappiness and aroused his critics. Correspondence between Beauregard and the administration, especially with Davis and Bragg, became vitriolic and only the tact and magnanimity of Robert E. Lee smoothed over several situations which would otherwise have damaged seriously the Confederate Army. Beauregard's feelings finally brought him to the point where he would accept almost any assignment that would get him out of Virginia. Lee knew of Beaure-

gard's unhappy state of mind and, in addition, was probably not entirely satisfied with Beauregard's generalship. In September, Lee asked Beauregard to inspect the Wilmington defences. While he was at Wilmington, Atlanta fell to Sherman.

It would be tedious, and pointless here, to follow in detail the political considerations which prompted Davis to offer Beauregard, on October 2nd, command of a new department to be called the Military Division of the West, a command extending from Georgia to the Mississippi River and comprising all or parts of five states (Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee). Early in October he assumed command of his new department and then ensued a series of conferences with General Hood. The latter did not trouble to keep Beauregard informed of his plans, which changed from day to day, and considerable friction resulted. Hood wished to try to decoy Sherman back north of Atlanta but he was very slow in getting his own northward thrust under way; he did not advance into Tennessee until November 21st. Five days before that, Sherman had started on the march that would destroy the last vital resources of the Southern Confederacy. Beauregard's troops were scattered all over his large department, - at, Mobile, Montgomery, Macon, Augusta, Savannah, and some even in South Carolina, and only an immediate concentration could afford any hope of stopping Sherman. For once the great apostle of concentration made no effort to concentrate. There were political and logistic reasons, one may presume, for his failure to follow his favorite doctrine on so vital an occasion. Whatever the reasons, the massed Federal army rolled on in triumph. Beauregard evacuated Savannah on December 20th. His efforts to place obstacles in Sherman's path were futile and sometimes ill-considered; he was very late in grasping Sherman's real objective of creating the anvil upon which Grant's hammer-blows could effectively fall. On February 17th, 1865, Beauregard evacuated Columbia, South Carolina, and retired to Greensboro, North Carolina. Richmond found

it difficult to believe Beauregard's dispatches. Lee, feeling that Beauregard was accomplishing nothing, suggested that Johnston supersede him. Davis did not like Johnston any better than he liked Beauregard but Lee pressed the appointment and Davis finally agreed. Beauregard, of course, was hurt. He was always second in command, - under Joe Johnston at Manassas, under Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh, under Lee at Petersburg, and now under Joe Johnston again. From this time on to the end, his duties were routine.

Disasters now shook the Confederacy in crowding succession. On April 3rd Richmond and Petersburg fell and Lee's worn-out army began its desperate nine days' march to Appomattox. On April 5th Davis, fleeing from Richmond to the protection of Johnston's army, was at Danville, guarded by a cavalry force sent there by Beauregard. On April 11th Davis moved further south to Greensboro and had Beauregard meet him there; Johnston arrived the next morning. Both told Davis that, in their opinion, it was hopeless to struggle any longer, and Johnston sought authority to treat with Sherman. As Davis continued his flight southward, Johnston and Sherman signed a document which deserves a prominent place in any account of Sherman's army career. Its prompt repudiation by the government at Washington does not lessen its magnanimity. Then Beauregard prepared to leave for home. On May 1st he and his staff started south. Part of the way they traveled in army wagons and traded army provisions for food. To Augusta, to Mobile, and thence by a U. S. naval transport to New Orleans. On May 21 he landed in that city. For the first time in more than four years he was home, home for the rest of his life of nearly seventy-five years, which came to an end on February 20, 1893.

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When one of my friends learned that I was going to ask this Club to devote a whole evening to General Beauregard, he asked "What did *he* do?" That question is symptomatic of the oblivion into which the once widely proclaimed hero has fallen. In textbooks which deal broadly with the Civil

War, we come across his name occasionally. In the more scholarly and detailed treatises, his name appears a little more frequently. But even in the South, where he was once so loved and so highly honored, he has fallen into obscurity. Why? What are the reasons? The answers to such a question can perhaps at best be surmises only, but perhaps they may be interesting surmises. In offering some possible answers to my own question, I shall list my suggestions in a sort of chronological order, avoiding thereby the temptation to point to one trait or one action or one utterance, and say "This is it." And I truly think that there is no one reason to which can be ascribed his fall from his pedestal of hero worship, but rather an interplay of the man's thoughts and actions and temperament and background and, sometimes, of circumstances beyond his control.

First, of course, one must remember that he was a Frenchman, a Gallic island in an Anglo-Saxon Sea. His very name proclaims this. Robert Edward Lee, Thomas Jonathan Jackson, Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Wade Hampton, Powell Hill and then Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard. And with the name went a temperament equally Gallic. His touchiness on what he considered points of honor, his insistence upon the recognition of his rank, his instant repulse of any word that, to him, seemed to reflect discredit upon any action of his, his constant references to Napoleon in connection with his own ideas of how to fight and win the war, all seem to set him apart from many of his fellow officers who could be tolerant of each other under most circumstances, even though tempers flared sometimes under stress. And in post-bellum arguments, these same qualities widened the rift. He just doesn't seem to fit into the picture. (Insert "A") see next sheet)

And so ~~Next~~ I would list next his own unbounded belief in himself and his abilities, an almost incredible assurance that he, alone of all Southern generals, could and, if left unhampered, would lead the forces of the South to swift and sure victory. Scarcely ever did he write one of his battle plans without

INSERT "A" (near bottom page 22)

Then I would mention his swift rise to the highest army rank, a full general. As a brigadier, he had been the first officer commissioned to general rank in the Provisional Army of the Confederacy; his sudden promotion to be the fifth ranking officer in that Army, coupled with the public and official adulation which both preceded and followed that promotion, must have tended to make him value himself more highly and to feel more than ever justified in his assumption of omniscience in military affairs.

adding at the end that it would beyond a doubt bring brilliant victory and independence within a short time. The two words "brilliant" and "independence" are to be found with a regularity that today sounds a bit monotonous. Much of this seems to have been due not only to his complete immersion in the accounts of Napoleon's campaigns and battles but also to his absorption in the writings of Jomini. Now, after all, Napoleon did fight a battle called Waterloo, and Jomini, following in his writings the actions of his great chief, laid more stress upon the capture of cities than upon the annihilation of the enemy army, a doctrine better adapted to the small, densely populated area of Western Europe than it was to the great distances of less densely populated America. (It remained for the German von Clausewitz to develope fully the strategy which taught annihilation of the opposing forces as the true objective of an army.) To whatever it may have been due, this unremitting insistence upon what he could accomplish if he were properly reinforced and then left unhampered to work his own way to victory, this "drivelling upon possibilities" as Pres. Davis called it, must account for his increasing unpopularity with his civilian superiors and with many of his military compeers. Again, he just doesn't fit into the picture.

And then I would mention his passion for writing. One contemporary of Jefferson Davis once expressed his belief that ink, not blood, flowed in the President's veins. This saying one might apply to Beauregard, provided a qualifying adjective be inserted - "purple." His style was lurid. An ancient Greek would have described it as Asiatic rather than Attic. It was florid rather than chaste. And how voluminous his writings are! Yet they did help to keep him in the public eye. Occasionally his reports appeared in public print before they reached the President's desk; letters to friends and to other officers were sometimes deliberately sent to the press. It is difficult to present his style of writing by means of brief extracts from his reports and letters; one needs to read a few of them in toto. And when one looks at them en masse, through the perspective of a century, one wonders how he ever found time to do anything

except write.

Be that as it may, his accomplishments in the War and his way of keeping himself before the public made his homecoming the triumphal procession of a hero and he was hailed in many parts of the South (and a little later in the North and in England) as one of the greatest figures of the Confederacy. From this pinnacle of fame he has through the years descended into the comparative oblivion of today.

That this oblivion is due in part to a more careful evaluation of his campaigns and of his wartime writings is obviously true, just as it is true of certain other conspicuous figures of both the North and the South. But in Beauregard's case, one must take into consideration certain of his acts and utterances in the twenty-eight years that intervened between the close of the War and his death. Many of the traits and qualities which he exhibited during the four years of armed strife are equally conspicuous in those years.

At the close of the War, the professional soldiers of the Confederate Army faced a bleak prospect. They had been trained for one profession, and this one profession, of course, they could not practice in the United States. Except for those who had really studied engineering at West Point and had had engineering experience in the United States Army, they were not fitted for civilian employment. In all cases, long army experience made it difficult for them to get along easily with civilian equals or under civilian superiors. Here Beauregard's engineering experience stood him in good stead. In October 1865 he became chief engineer and general superintendent of the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad ("The Jackson Road") at a salary of 3,500 a year, which at the end of a month was increased to 5,000. He performed a splendid service in his swift and efficient rehabilitation of the war-torn road. Five years of successful administration of this road ended in 1870 when the Republican administration of Governor Henry Clay Warmoth politically and financially gained control of the Jackson Road and manouvered

Beauregard out of his position. (Beauregard could almost certainly have kept his position if he had been willing to "play ball" with the politicians.) Meantime, in 1866, Beauregard had leased the two chief street car (steam) and bus systems of New Orleans but this venture, too, though a financial success, was lost to Beauregard through his over-trustfulness of his associates. After this, he offered for several rail and industrial positions but did not get any one of them; there was ever in his applications something of that same fertile imagination coupled with the fantastic ideas of execution that had characterized his army plans. He had some part, under bridge-builder James B. Eads, in the construction of the jetties which keep the mouth of the Mississippi River open to ocean-going commerce. And during these years he, like many other ex-Confederates, had often played with the idea of leaving the United States and becoming a soldier of fortune and he made tentative moves toward the King of Italy, toward Louis Napoleon of France. Roumania did offer him a position but he declined it. Cuba was a possibility which he considered. The Khedive of Egypt offered him a position at 12,000 a year. Beauregard claims that he turned it down but there is some mystery about the end of the negotiations, a mystery that is deepened by the fact that a nephew of "Beast" Butler was at that time consul general in Egypt. In the Franco-Prussian War he applied for a general's commission in the French army but received no reply. Then he tried Egypt again, without success. Argentina offered him command of its army but Beauregard's financial terms were too high for that country. In 1876, with the approach of the end of Reconstruction in Louisiana, he finally decided to remain in the United States. His participation in Reconstruction politics did nothing to increase his stature among his fellow citizens. He never dallied with the idea of turning Republican á la Longstreet but he was a leader in the "Louisiana Unification Movement" of 1873, which, had it been successful, would have bestowed upon the Negroes a very considerable measure of political, civil and economic equality. The City approved and supported it;

the country parishes despised it and defeated it.

Beauregard was in financial straits in 1878 when a ripe melon fell into his lap, - a melon which would leave a bitter taste in his mouth. The story of the Louisiana Lottery is a fascinating book in itself, far too long even to be outlined here. From 1868 to 1893 it dominated the political, economic and social life of New Orleans and the state. After nearly a decade of highly successful operation, questions arose more and more frequently about the fairness of the drawings, and the manager bethought himself of a plan to silence these complaints. He would have two Confederate generals sit on the platform and supervise the operation of the wheels of chance. Naturally he turned first to General Beauregard and also offered him the privilege of choosing his colleague. With some qualms about his reputation, and in a rather defensively worded announcement, Beauregard accepted the position. He first asked Wade Hampton to be his associate; the latter replied that he would accept if he should fail of election as governor of South Carolina. Upon Hampton's election, Beauregard approached our own Jubal Anderson Early. The latter accepted the dubious honor as soon as he was assured that the lottery was not run by Republicans. The pay of the two supervisors is a matter of some speculation but it can scarcely have been less than an average of 10,000 a year each plus an allowance for expenses. In 1883 Beauregard told the manager that he would resign unless his base salary of 10,000 a year was raised, adding that the stipend was not enough to compensate for the vilification he had to endure. He apparently invested his salary to good advantage. At his death in 1893 his estate was very conservatively estimated at 150,000. People of the day could not associate so much wealth with a defeated Confederate general, and so the legend decays further. The wealthy Creole just did not fit into what some writers have called the myth of the Southern general.

No one has ever questioned General Beauregard's personal bravery. No one has ever doubted his passionate loyalty to the South, to the Confederacy. Few are the critics who have questioned his ability to fight his troops once battle had been joined. No one questions his personal honesty, his character, even though one may regret that he did lend his name to the lottery. Even in his manouverings after the War, he was always transparently honest, sometimes naively honest. He was a bitter personal enemy, a good hater who never forgot - he once wrote a friend "Mr. Davis stinks in my nostrils." - but he was always frank about his hatreds. In 1884, through his ghost writer, Alfred Roman, he published a ponderous two-volume work called "The Military Operations of General Beauregard," a work which adds nothing to his stature. In it he assailed nearly every important Confederate civil and military official. Jefferson Davis and his advisers suffered the worst blows of his verbal lash and they were closely followed by the two Johnstons. Even Lee was not exempt. The feud with Davis continued until until the latter died in 1889, while the two were still engaged in a bitter controversy over Shiloh.

Beauregard looked back longingly and with pride upon fo-de-war days and there was always a touch of the old South about him. But he also looked forward to a more industrial South, to a South which would never again, he hoped, be dependent upon the North for everything manufactured, from cribs to coffins. He oriented himself toward the new South without entirely losing his bearings on the old South, - a fact that people have not always grasped. And as we take leave of him, as we leave him with his many fine traits and with some not so fine, we may do well to remember his naive honesty and frankness even in the midst of his unforgiving hatreds, as manifested in something which occurred when he was seventy-one years old. When Jefferson Davis died, Beauregard was invited to ride in a carriage at the head of the

funeral cortege. After a long bout with his own conscience, he came down from the room where he had been writing a letter to the delegation which had invited him, and said to his family: "I told them I would not do it. We have always been enemies. I cannot pretend I am sorry he is gone. I am no hypocrite."

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